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Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three
Wars, by Vincent P. O’Hara and Leonard R.
Heinz. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2022. 336 pages. $36.95.

Many aspects of warfare may remain
the same through the centuries, but the
weapons of war do not. Weapons developed, tested, and used in one conflict
become standard arms in subsequent
wars. Today’s experimental weapon may
become tomorrow’s weapon of choice.
For navies, new technologies become
part of doctrine, practices, and platforms.
The authors of Innovating Victory study
six emerging technologies in naval
conflict during three wars of the twentieth century: the Russo-Japanese War,
World War I, and World War II. They
provide a macroperspective on mines,
torpedoes, radio, radar, submarines, and
aircraft; after an introduction and an
opening chapter titled “Use, Doctrine,
Innovation,” one chapter is devoted to
each of these technologies. Each such
chapter is structured similarly, presenting
to readers information on and discussion
of the discovery, evolution, and exploitation of the technology. In the course of
doing so, the authors tell how these “six
technologies facilitated and frustrated
navies in their pursuit of victory” (p. 5).
In the introduction, readers are
reminded that in the twentieth century
there were four waves of technological change for navies, three of them
climaxing in one war—World War II.
The first wave began in the midnineteenth century with the shift from
sail to coal-fired steam engines, and
included the development of armor, the
improvement of guns and mines, the
rise of torpedoes, and the introduction
of radio. The second wave, from 1905
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to 1918, brought to naval warfare
submarines and aircraft. The third wave
was made up of radar and sonar, which
“revolutionized the collection and use of
information, and saw the introduction
of practical guided weapons” (p. 2). The
fourth and final wave is still ongoing. It
began with the splitting of the atom and
includes satellites, drones, computers
and data networks, artificial intelligence,
and weapons that employ magnetic
and directed energy. (This fourth wave
is worthy of its own volume.)
The first chapter reminds readers how
quickly naval technologies changed
during the twentieth century. Some of
the ships of the British and German
navies that fought at the Battle of
Jutland in 1916 were twice as large
as the battleships that had fought ten
years earlier at the Battle of Tsushima,
and they fired shells that were twice as
heavy at twice the range. Within three
decades, junior officers who had fought
at Jutland, now senior officers, might
have used radar and guided weapons in
World War II. Not only is technological
development fast moving, but it does
not follow a specific trajectory that
permits rapid establishment of doctrine
regarding its use. Further, technological
advantages in warfare rarely endure, and
not all naval technologies developed
are successful when employed.
Mines are the subject of the second
chapter. Mines as a naval weapon came
to maturity during the Russo-Japanese
War, and by the war’s end all major
navies had begun to study the conflict
for lessons about this and other new
technologies with an eye to future wars.
Properly used, mines can be highly
effective, yet the authors contend that
even though mine warfare is a core
naval capability, navies do not prioritize
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it, in part because it is not a compelling technology with an emotional
component that will “command the
imagination like aircraft carriers and
nuclear submarines do” (p. 50). This lack
hinders advocacy of the technology.
The third chapter’s study of torpedoes
shows that the maturation of torpedo
warfare was slow and sporadic. After the
Russo-Japanese War there was debate
regarding the future role of torpedoes,
because of their negligible effects in that
war, but by the eve of World War I the
range, speed, and warhead weight of
torpedoes had increased—with deadly
consequences. The British, Germans,
and Americans all faced difficulties
with sea-launched torpedoes, and early
in the war the Americans’ air-dropped
torpedoes had a staggering failure rate.
For U.S. torpedoes, a reliable magnetic
exploder did not appear until 1943, but
after that the results were impressive.
The authors contend that, more than for
any other technology, torpedo development “shows that the combination of
the right platform and the right target
transforms a technology of marginal
application into one with war-winning
potential” (pp. 77–78). They continue
this argument in the sixth and seventh
chapters, dealing respectively with the
development of submarines and aircraft.
Chapters 4 and 5 (radio and radar,
respectively) provide summaries that for
this reviewer were the most informative
and show the exponential effects of
combining technologies in warfare. Both
technologies are constructed to use the
electromagnetic spectrum, but with
different core purposes. For radio, it is
communication; for radar, detection. The
Italian navy began testing shore-to-ship
radio in 1897, and the British navy did
so in 1899. Radio systems that competed
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with Marconi’s invention soon arose,
with other navies favoring them. By the
time of the Russo-Japanese War, radio’s
naval utility had been proved, and the
technology continued to improve. The
interwar years saw the initial development of radar and its varied use by belligerent nations, and World War II saw its
maturation as an effective naval weapon.
The final two chapters, dealing with
submarines and airplanes, likely will
cover ground more familiar to most
readers, and the authors present very
good overviews of these technologies as
naval weapons. The concluding chapter
provides a synthesis of the lessons
learned from the six weapons studies.
The volume has numerous photographs
and charts that enhance the study, as
well as an extensive bibliography. Equally
weighted chapters provide balance to
the book and ensure it is readable to
generalists yet informative and thought
provoking for all; it is filled with historical examples, well written, and engaging.
TIMOTHY J. DEMY

Military Virtues, ed. Michael Skerker, David
Whetham, and Don Carrick. Havant, U.K.: Howgate, 2019. 410 pages. $39.99.

The opening line of Military Virtues captures the attention of the reader with the
provocative teaser: “What does Aristotle
have to teach a fighter pilot?” (p. xxv). In
response to the question, editors Michael
Skerker, David Whetham, and Don
Carrick integrate articles by thirty-eight
warfighters, professors, and chaplains
into one book, combining both theory
and practice into a cohesive exploration
of moral virtues for the profession of
arms. Each of the fourteen segments on
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